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Abstract. The competitive price game model is used to 
analyze the spectrum sharing in the cognitive radio net-
works. This paper focuses on the improved spectrum shar-
ing problem with constraints of available spectrum 
resource from primary users. The constrained spectrum 
sharing model based on competitive price game is estab-
lished. In order to achieve the spectrum sharing strategy 
that satisfies the constraints from primary users, the 
Rockafeller multiplier method is applied to deal with the 
constraints of available licensed spectrum resource, and 
the improved profit function is achieved, which can be used 
to measure the impact of shared spectrum price strategies 
on the system profit. However, in the competitive price 
game based spectrum sharing problem of practical cogni-
tive radio network, primary users have to determine the 
shared spectrum price without the acknowledgement of the 
other primary user’s price strategies simultaneously. Thus 
a fast gradient iterative calculation method of equilibrium 
price is proposed, only with acknowledgement of the 
shared spectrum price strategies during last cycle. 
Through the adaptive iteration at the direction with largest 
gradient of improved profit function, the equilibrium price 
strategies can be achieved rapidly. It can also avoid the 
predefinition of the adjustment factor according to the 
parameters of communication system in conventional 
linear iteration method. Simulation results show that the 
proposed competitive price game based spectrum sharing 
model can be applied in the cognitive radio networks with 
constraints of available licensed spectrum resource, and it 
has better convergence performance. 
Keywords 
Cognitive radio, spectrum sharing, game theory, 
competitive price model. 
1. Introduction 
Cognitive radio is viewed as an effective approach for 
improving the utilization of the radio spectrum [1], [2]. The 
cognitive transceivers have flexible spectrum sensing abil-
ity, and can adjust transmission parameters adaptively 
according to the ambient environment. The spare spectrum  
of licensed users (primary user) can be accessed by the 
cognitive users (secondary user) dynamically without caus-
ing harmful interference. As the behaviors of the primary 
users and secondary users interact with each other, game 
theory, which is viewed as an effective tool for the analysis 
of interactive decision making, is applied in the spectrum 
sharing problem of cognitive radio networks [3], [4]. Duist 
Niyato introduced the competitive price model to the spec-
trum sharing problem in cognitive radio networks, and 
discussed the Nash equilibrium price strategies that maxi-
mize the profits of primary users. As the price strategies of 
other primary users are usually not available simultane-
ously, the iterative equilibrium price calculation was fur-
ther analyzed [5], [6]. The spectrum sharing problem with 
price strategies offered simultaneously and sequentially is 
also discussed in [7]. Xuezhi Tan discussed the selection of 
adjustment factor in the calculation of the equilibrium price 
[8]. The calculation of the equilibrium shared spectrum 
price is analyzed in [9]. But only the spectrum sharing 
problem with the assumption that the spectrum demand of 
the cognitive users could be satisfied was discussed in the 
research above. In order to guarantee the communication 
quality of the primary users in the practical application, the 
spectrum sharing problem with the constraints of maximum 
available spectrum resource is more universal. In this paper, 
we develop an improved spectrum sharing model based on 
competitive price game with the consideration of limited 
spectrum resources from primary users, and discuss the 
iterative calculation of the equilibrium shared spectrum 
price. We proposed a fast gradient iterative method based 
equilibrium price calculation scheme, which can avoid the 
predefinition of the adjustment factor, and achieve the 
equilibrium price iteratively with better convergence per-
formance. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion 2, we describe the system model of spectrum sharing 
in cognitive radio networks. In section 3, the spectrum 
sharing problem based on competitive price game is ana-
lyzed, with the consideration of constraints of available 
spectrum resource from the primary users. In section 4, the 
calculation of the equilibrium price without acknowledge-
ment of the price strategies from other primary users is 
further analyzed. Section 5 presents the simulation results, 
and section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. System Model 
Considering a wireless system with multiple primary 
users, the communication of secondary users is served by 
a secondary service for simplicity. The spectrum sharing 
problem between the multiple primary users and secondary 
users can be equivalent with the spectrum sharing problem 
between multiple primary users and single secondary user 
service. Assuming N primary users within the cognitive 
radio network, primary user i tends to share portion of its 
spare spectrum with secondary user at price pi. The com-
munication requirements of secondary user should be satis-
fied with assurance of primary users’ communication 
qualities, and certain economic revenue is obtained by the 
primary users through spectrum sharing. The demanded 
spectrum size of secondary user here is determined by its 
transmission efficiency and the shared spectrum price that 
provided by primary users. The transmission efficiency of 
secondary user is related to the modulation and channel 
qualities, which can be expressed as follows [10]: 
 2log (1 )k K   (1) 
where γ is the signal to noise ratio of the secondary re-
ceiver, K = 1.5/[ln(0.2/BERtar)], BERtar is the required bit 
error performance of the secondary user. 
The primary users tend to maximize their profits com-
petitively by controlling price strategies of the shared spec-
trum, which is defined as Bertrand price model in econom-
ics, and it is used to analyze the spectrum sharing problem 
in cognitive radio networks. The primary users provide the 
price strategies of shared spectrum, and the demanded 
spectrum size of the secondary user is determined from its 
utility function, which is relevant to the price strategies 
provided by primary users. The spectrum sharing profits of 
primary user depend on the economic revenue and the cost 
due to spectrum sharing. Here, the cost of spectrum sharing 
is defined as the degradation of the quality of service 
(QoS). The primary users constantly adjust the price strate-
gies of shared spectrum to achieve the maxima of their own 
profits. 
3. Constrained Spectrum Sharing 
Model Based on Competitive Price 
Game 
The demanded spectrum size of secondary user can 
be calculated through the quadratic utility function that is 
described as follows [5]: 
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where b is the set of the shared spectrum size from differ-
ent primary users, b={b1, b2,…,bN}; pi is the price strategy 
of shared spectrum from primary user i, p={p1, p2,…,pN}; 
ki(s) is the spectrum efficiency of secondary user that can be 
achieved by occupying the spectrum resource from primary 
user i; v is the spectrum substitutability factor, and 
v  [0,1]. When v = 0, the spectrum resource of different 
primary users can’t be substituted, while v = 1, the spec-
trum resource of different primary users can be substituted 
freely. The demanded spectrum size by secondary users 
can be get by 
 ( ) 0
i
U
b
 
b . (3) 
Thus we can get 
 ( ) 0si i j ij ik b v b p    . (4) 
The size of shared spectrum can be rewritten as the 
linear equations according to (4) 
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The demanded spectrum size of the secondary user 
can be expressed as D=[b1 b2…bN]T, F=[k1(s)-p1  
k2(s)- p2…kN(s)-pN]T, and A is the N×N coefficients matrix. 
The size of demanded spectrum can be obtained by 
 1D A F  (6) 
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The elements in the inverse of A matrix can be 
achieved by elementary transform. 
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With the acknowledgement of shared spectrum price 
strategies p, the size of demanded spectrum can be 
expressed as follows: 
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The cost of spectrum sharing in this paper is defined 
by the QoS degradation of primary users. The revenue 
function Ri and cost function Ci for the primary user i that 
provides certain size of shared spectrum are defined as 
follows respectively[5]. 
 1i iR c M , (9) 
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where c1, c2 are constants that denote the weights between 
revenue function and cost function, Bireq is the bandwidth 
requirement of primary user, Wi is the total size of avail-
able spectrum, Mi is the number of primary connections, 
and ki(p) is the transmission efficiency of primary users. 
Thus, the profit function of primary user i can be expressed 
as 
 ( ) ( )i i i i i iP b p R C b  p . (11) 
In Bertrand price model, the players of the game are 
the primary users, the strategies of the players are prices of 
shared spectrum, i.e. {pi}, and the utility function is the 
achieved profit, i.e. {Pi}. If the spectrum demand of cogni-
tive user can be satisfied by the primary users, i.e. the 
available spectrum resource of the primary users are larger 
than the spectrum demand Di(p) of the secondary user, the 
profit function of primary users i is given by [5] 
2
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However, in practical spectrum sharing model for 
cognitive radio networks, the spectrum resources of the 
primary users are usually restricted. The spectrum demand 
of the secondary users will not be definitely satisfied by the 
primary users. Thus, it needs to consider the constraints of 
the shared spectrum size. Bimax is the maximum shared 
spectrum size of primary user i, and the competitive price 
game based spectrum sharing model with constraints of 
shared spectrum for cognitive radio networks can be for-
mulated as (13), i.e. determine the price strategy p* satisfies 
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where p* is also defined as the Nash equilibrium price of 
the competitive price game. In order to achieve the p* that 
satisfies (13), the relaxation variables y1i2, y2i2 are applied. 
There must exist specific variable yji2 equivalent with Di(p). 
Thus the improved profit function can be obtained 
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where σ, ω1i, ω2i are constant variables, with further 
simplification of (14), we can obtain 
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The value of y1i2, y2i2 is determined with the objective 
of maximizing the improved profit function, which can be 
given by 
2 2 max1 2
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Substitute (16) into (15), we can get 
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The above function can be seen as a stage function, 
and at the stage points, the left limit equals the right limit, 
thus function (17) is derivative. In order to achieve the 
equilibrium price strategy p*, we can have 
 ( ) 0 1, ,
i
i N
p
    
p  (18) 
where 
1
1 1
max1
1
( ) ( )( ) max 0, ( )
2
( )max 0, ( )
2
N N
i i i
i
i ii i i
N
i i
i i
i i
P DD
p p p
DD B
p
 



 

         
      
 

p pp p
pp
 
4. Iterative Calculation of the Shared 
Spectrum Price 
In practical cognitive radio networks, the price strate-
gies of other primary users cannot be achieved simultane-
ously, the Nash equilibrium price strategy of the competi-
tive price model cannot be achieved through the linear 
equations formed by (18). Thus, it is needed to further 
discuss the iterative price calculation method without 
acknowledgement of price strategies from other primary 
users simultaneously [5]. 
Assume the price strategies of other primary users 
cannot be achieved simultaneously, but the shared spec-
trum price strategies of primary users during last cycle is 
available. The Nash equilibrium price that maximizes the 
system profits of the primary users can be achieved itera-
tively. 
4.1 The Linear Iterative Method 
The linear gradient descent algorithm is one of the 
effective tools to calculate the maximum and minimum 
value of continuous target function during the optimization 
problems. For the primary users, the profit function is 
convex with the variation of shared spectrum price. At the 
kth iteration, pik is the shared spectrum price of primary user 
i, Pik(p) is the profit of primary user i, and φk(p) is the 
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improved system profit function. If the available spectrum 
resource of the primary users is larger than the spectrum 
demand of the secondary user and ∂φ(p)/∂pik is positive, 
the value of the improved system profit function of primary 
users will increase iteratively with the increase of pik until 
the maximum of the improved system profit function is 
obtained or the spectrum constraints of the primary users 
cannot be satisfied. When the available spectrum resource 
constraints can be satisfied and ∂φ(p)/∂pik is negative, with 
the linear iteration as (19), the value of the improved sys-
tem profit function will decrease until the equilibrium 
shared spectrum price is achieved. It is due to the cognitive 
user tends to demand less spectrum resource when the 
price of the shared spectrum is too high. Besides, when the 
spectrum demand of the secondary user can not be satisfied 
by the available spectrum resource of primary users, i.e. the 
cognitive user tends to apply for more spectrum resource 
than spectrum constraints, the value of the improved profit 
function will also decreases. Thus the equilibrium price of 
the shared spectrum that maximizes the improved system 
profit function and satisfies the constraints of available 
spectrum resource can be achieved iteratively. 
 1 ( )k k
i i k
i
p p a
p
   
p  (19) 
where a is the nonnegative adjustment factor. With appro-
priate value of adjustment factor, the shared spectrum price 
that maximizes the improved system profit function can be 
achieved iteratively. 
The value of adjustment factor is very important for 
the calculation of the equilibrium shared spectrum price. If 
the adjustment factor is too large, strong fluctuations will 
exist in the calculation of shared spectrum price, or even 
the equilibrium shared spectrum price can’t be achieved. 
On the contrary, if the value of the adjustment factor is too 
small, the variation of calculated price changes slowly, and 
more iterations are also needed to achieve the equilibrium 
shared spectrum price. Thus the appropriate adjustment 
value is necessary for iterative method to achieve the 
equilibrium price of the competitive price game based 
spectrum sharing model. 
4.2 The Fast Gradient Iterative Method 
Based on the above research, a fast gradient iterative 
method is proposed to obtain the equilibrium price of 
shared spectrum. It does not need the predefinition of the 
adjustment factor according to the transmission parameters 
of the cognitive radio networks, and it can achieve the 
equilibrium price of the shared spectrum with less 
iterations. 
The steepest gradient descend algorithm, which is 
firstly proposed by the French mathematician Cauchy, is 
one of the important optimization methods. The iterations 
in the steepest descent direction of the target function are 
applied to achieve the minimum value of the target func-
tion. This paper applies principle of the steepest gradient 
descend algorithm, and uses the direction with the fast 
variation of the improved system profit function to calcu-
late the equilibrium price of shared spectrum iteratively. 
The adjustment factor of the fast gradient method is 
adjusted to guarantee the shared spectrum price iterations 
in the gradient direction of the improved system profit 
function. The target function here is defined as 
 ( ) arg max ( )f p p . (20) 
The directional gradient of the target function dik at 
the price strategy pk can be defined as 
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With one-dimensional investigation along the direc-
tion dk, and the value of the adjustment factor λ is updated 
to guarantee the direction with fast variation. 
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The price strategy of shared spectrum is calculated 
according to (24), until the variation of the price strategy 
can satisfy the precision requirement. 
 1k k k ki i ip p d   . (24) 
5. Simulation Results 
We consider the cognitive radio networks with two 
primary users and one secondary service, the total spec-
trum bandwidth of each primary user is 20 MHz, and the 
primary connections are set as M1 = 10 and M2 = 14 respec-
tively. The required communication bandwidth of primary 
users Bireq is 2 MHz. The weights of the revenue and cost 
function c1 = c2 = 2. The target BER performance is 10-4, 
806 Y. B. LI, R. YANG, Y. LIN, F. YE, THE SPECTRUM SHARING IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS BASED ON COMPETITIVE … 
and the SNR is 20 dB, the spectrum substitutability factor 
v = 0.4. The initial value of the shared spectrum price is set 
to be 0 in the iterative method to calculate the Nash equi-
librium price. 
Fig. 1 shows the system profit of primary users with 
variable shared spectrum price when sufficient spectrum 
resource can be provided by primary users. It can be con-
cluded from Fig. 1 that the system profit is convex with the 
variation of shared spectrum price, the maximum system 
profit can be achieved at certain price strategy. 
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Fig. 1. The total revenue of primary users with variation of 
shared spectrum price. 
Fig. 2 shows the simulation results of shared spectrum 
size under different spectrum constraints of primary users, 
among which the available spectrum constraint of primary 
users 2 B2max is fixed as 1 MHz and the available spectrum 
constraints of primary users 1 B1max is set to be varied from 
restricted to sufficient respectively. It can be concluded 
from Fig. 2 that, when the available spectrum resource 
from primary user 1 restricted, the secondary user tends to 
demand the remaining shared spectrum from primary user 
2. With the increase of B1max, the shared spectrum size from 
primary user 1 is increased, and the shared spectrum size 
from primary user 2 is decreased accordingly. When the 
available spectrum of primary user 1 is larger than the 
demanded spectrum size of secondary user, the shared 
spectrum size from primary user 1 will not increase with 
the increase of B1max, and the secondary user tends to de-
mand the reasonable spectrum size that maximizes its own 
utility function. 
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Fig. 2. The calculation of Nash equilibrium price by linear 
equations. 
Fig. 3 shows the calculation of the Nash equilibrium 
price by the linear iterative method under different adjust-
ment factors. It can be concluded from Fig. 3 that the value 
of the adjustment factor has significant impact on the itera-
tive calculation of the Nash equilibrium price. When the 
adjustment factor is small, the price of shared spectrum 
varies slightly, and the convergence speed in calculation of 
the shared spectrum price is slow; when the adjustment 
factor is large, although the price of the shared spectrum 
varies significantly, it may also affect the convergence 
speed of the linear gradient method due to strong fluctua-
tions.  
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(a) with restricted primary resource, B1max=1 and B2max=1 
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(b) with sufficient primary resource, B1max=2 and B2max=1 
Fig. 3. The iterative calculation of Nash equilibrium price 
under different adjustment factor. 
Fig. 4 shows simulation result of linear iterative 
method with inadequate adjustment factor. It can be con-
cluded from Fig.4 that inadequate adjustment factor may 
lead to unstable shared spectrum price strategy, and the 
value of adjustment factor has significant impact on the 
convergence of the linear iterative method. 
Fig. 5 shows the simulation results of equilibrium 
price by fast gradient iterative method proposed in this 
paper, it is consistent with the achieved shared spectrum 
price in Fig. 3. The fast gradient method also does not need 
the price strategies of other primary users simultaneously. 
It can adjust the price strategies in the direction with the 
fastest variations of the system profit function, and it can 
achieve the equilibrium price strategy that satisfies the 
available spectrum resource constraints from the primary 
users. 
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Fig. 4. The calculation of Nash equilibrium price with 
inadequate adjustment factor. 
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Fig. 5. The calculation of Nash equilibrium price through fast 
gradient iterative scheme. 
Fig. 6 shows the simulation results of the convergence 
performance of the fast gradient method and the conven-
tional linear gradient method. It can be concluded from 
Fig. 6 that the fast gradient iterative method has better 
convergence speed in the calculation of the equilibrium 
price, and it can also avoid the predefinition of the adjust-
ment factor according to the communication parameters in 
the cognitive radio networks. 
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Fig. 6. The convergence speed of linear iterative scheme and 
fast gradient iterative scheme. 
6. Conclusions 
The competitive price game model is applied to ana-
lyze the spectrum sharing problem in cognitive radio net-
works. The primary users can obtain economic revenue by 
sharing portion of their spare spectrum, and the primary 
users provide price strategies of the shared spectrum com-
petitively, and the secondary users determine the demanded 
spectrum size according to the price of shared spectrum 
and its own communication parameters. The primary users 
tend to select the shared spectrum price that maximizes 
their system profit. The spectrum sharing problem with 
constraints based on competitive price game model is fur-
ther analyzed in this paper. The improved system profit 
function is formed by the Rockafeller multiplier algorithm, 
and the shared spectrum price strategy that maximizes the 
system profit and satisfies the constraints of the available 
spectrum resource from the primary users can be achieved. 
A fast gradient algorithm based iterative method is pro-
posed to calculate the shared spectrum price. It can achieve 
the shared spectrum price that satisfies the available spec-
trum constraints without the dependence on the price 
strategies from other primary users simultaneously, and has 
better convergence performance.  
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